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ABOUT THIS POLICY BRIEF 
 
 
On 21 February 2011, the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies convened 
a workshop on “China, India and Global Environmental Governance: The Case of 
Climate Change”. 
 
The event was chaired by Prof. Dr. Hans Bruyninckx, Director of the Research 
Institute for Work and Society (HIVA), Professor for International Relations and 
Global Environmental Governance and senior member of the Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies at K.U.Leuven. Invited speakers were Prof. Dr. A. 
Damodaran, Professor in Economics and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of 
Management at Bangalore, Dr. Jingquan Chen, Second Secretary at the Mission of 
the People’s Republic of China to the EU, and Mr. Jürgen Lefevere, Advisor for 
International and Climate Strategy at the European Commission’s DG Climate 
Action. The programme of the workshop is included in the annex to this policy brief. 
 
The policy brief takes the workshop as a basis for a discussion of China’s and India’s 
current and future roles in global environmental and climate governance. Where it 
employs the views expressed by the speakers, these represent personal views 
rather than those of their respective institutions. The policy brief should therefore not 
be considered as literal minutes of the meeting, nor can any parts of it be attributed 
to a particular speaker. 
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1. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN A POLARIZING WORLD : 
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 
 
Despite a decennia-long quest for global institutions that could guarantee effective 
policies for the protection of the environment in domains ranging from deforestation 
over desertification to climate change, the state of the planet has by and large not 
seen any substantial improvement since the onset of global environmental 
governance. On the contrary, existing trends of environmental degradation have 
been reinforced for a whole range of problems and “effective policy responses are 
needed at all levels of governance” (UNEP 2007: chapter 1). This can be adequately 
demonstrated with the example of climate change. The emission of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) has not been halted by the emergence of a United Nations (UN) 
climate regime in recent decades. As a result, trends such as the rise of global mean 
temperature around 0.75 °C between 1906 to 2005 and of sea levels by an average of 
1.8 mm per year since 1961 are bound to be set forth (IPCC 2007: 2-4). The effects of 
these trends can already be felt across the planet in the form of changed weather 
patterns, impacting on human living conditions in various ways, and sparking 
concerns about possibly “abrupt or irreversible” consequences of climate change 
(IPCC 2007: 13). 
 
Key drivers of a further degradation of the environment are, above all, global 
production and consumption patterns coupled to continued population growth (UNEP 
2007: chapter 1). Further pressure on eco-systems is thus bound to come from 
major population and growth centres like China and India. While the rapid ascent of 
these nations in economic terms has been welcomed from a developmental 
perspective, both countries’ growth patterns have already exacerbated pollution 
within their borders, and are contributing to processes of environmental degradation 
at a global scale. Both are faced with a dilemma: where pollution-related problems 
(air and water pollution, forest loss, desertification) have multiplied in China as much 
as in India, the energy needed for sustaining growth in both countries stems, in the 
first place, from the combustion of coal and oil (Jakobson 2009: 33, 37-39; 
Korppoo/Luta 2009: 56-59). This, in turn, implies that both players’ continued 
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commitment to growth is bound to significantly contribute to pollution, notably climate 
change, for years on end.  
 
Table 1. Current and Historical Carbon Dioxide Emissions (2005) 
 Share of global 
emissions 
(2005, CO2e) 
Per capita 
emissions 
(2005, tCO2e) 
Cumulative CO2 emissions 
as share of global 
emissions (1950-2005) 
US 18.29% 23.4 26.47% 
EU 13.86% 10.1 23.8% 
China 19.13% 5.5 10.9% 
India 4.92% 1.7 2.64% 
Source: World Resources Institute (http://cait.wri.org) 
 
 
As a matter of fact, both Indian and Chinese GHG emissions are projected to rise 
steeply for the foreseeable future. In recent years already, China has overtaken the 
United States as the largest absolute emitter of greenhouse gases, while Indian 
responsibility for climate change remained fairly limited to date (see Table 1). Under 
the business-as-usual scenario, China would overtake Western Europe as a 
cumulative CO2 contributor during the 2020s and the US by mid-century, while India 
would arrive at an equal level of cumulative CO2 emissions as Western Europe by 
2080 (Botzen et al. 2008: 571).  
 
From a sustainable development perspective, the current and projected Chinese and 
Indian growth patterns will not only have ever more devastating repercussions for the 
state of the global environment, but this “environmental degradation (…) threatens 
future development progress” in the long run (UNEP 2007: chapter 1), especially 
because both China and India are highly vulnerable to environmental problems, most 
importantly the effects of climate change.  
 
This outlook moves both players centre-stage when it comes to tackling 
environmental challenges through global governance.  Global environmental 
governance is essentially about humanity’s attempt at protecting the environment as 
a global common good through actions at not just the global, but multiple levels of 
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policy-making, stretching from the global over the national to the local (Biermann  
2006). At each of these levels, both China and India have actively begun to engage 
in forging solutions to pollution-related problems: at the local and national levels 
through policy frameworks and concrete hands-on initiatives, in the global sphere via 
an active implication in recent negotiation rounds under the UN on problems such as 
biodiversity loss (e.g. at the 2010 Nagoya Biodiversity Summit) or climate change 
(e.g. through organizing negotiation sessions like the New Delhi conference of the 
parties (COP) 8 in 2002 or the Tianjin preparatory session for COP 16 in 2010). 
These negotiations are also - besides a common border in the Himalayan - the key 
tie that binds the two countries on environmental topics. Where this bond had long 
been their memberships to the G-77/China coalition of over 140 developing 
countries, it is now a joint adherence to a “coalition within this coalition” created in 
2010: the BASIC group of emerging powers, including Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China.  
 
This policy brief explores what role(s) China and India play in contemporary global 
environmental governance. This is initially done through brief single-country studies 
of, first, China, and, then, India. Subsequently, a view will be taken at these two 
countries through the lens of the European Union (EU), another major player in 
global environmental governance. The contribution refers to global environmental 
governance more generally, but consistently focuses on global climate governance 
as an emblematic example, which tries to tackle the currently most visible 
environmental problem. Although local and national developments are evoked, 
attention is centrally paid to the current state of global climate negotiations under the 
United Nations umbrella. 
 
 
2. CHINA AS A PLAYER IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Three decades of double-digit economic growth launched by the 1979 reform and 
open-door policy have transformed China’s role in global environmental governance 
dramatically. The country moved from contesting global environmental governance 
as a “problem confined to capitalism” in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) over hesitant participation in the 1992 Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) to actual engagement in 
the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 
(Heggelund 2007; Najam 2005). 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, communist China tended to be rather hostile towards 
international cooperation. Even as the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities slowly started to replace the focus on national sovereignty and non-
interference as the cornerstone of Chinese environmental diplomacy during the 
1992-2002 period (Ding 2007: 232; Zhang 1998: 14), the country’s approach 
remained defensive in terms of the weight of responsibility for developing versus 
developed countries 
 
Figure 1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Consumption in China (1980-2009) 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 2010 (http://www.eia.gov) 
 
The most important shift in Chinese engagement in global environmental 
governance, could, however, be detected in the UN climate regime in more recent 
years. It was mostly China’s intense economic growth and subsequent global 
political weight that determined this change, as opposed to a transformation of its 
underlying interests and principles. At the 2009 Copenhagen summit, China played, 
together with the US, a key role during the last days, which underscored how 
important the country’s position as an emerging economy has become in the climate 
regime compared to the 1997 Kyoto and 1992 UNFCCC negotiations. China’s active 
cooperation is now a central requirement to reach a global agreement on climate 
change. Any stand-off between the US and China therefore leads to a stalemate of 
regime negotiations. In addition to its overall emergence as an economic and 
political power, this new role in the climate negotiations is particularly due to its 
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booming GHG emissions during the past 10 years and their resulting and projected 
impact on the global environment (see Figure 1).  
 
China increasingly recognizes its role in the global climate problematique, but 
refuses to commit to binding emission reduction targets so far. Current efforts remain 
limited to the inscription of domestic legislation and targets in the Copenhagen and 
Cancun deals under the so-called “pledge and review approach”. Before 
Copenhagen, China had already advanced a number of targets related to energy 
and carbon efficiency and renewable energy development. These included a 
reduction of the amount of carbon emitted per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% in 2020 
(based on 2005 levels) and a 15% share of renewable energy in its total energy mix 
by 2020 (United Nations 2010). 
A notable shift in China’s stance on climate change actually occurred in the 
aftermath of the failure to reach a binding global agreement in Copenhagen. As it 
was fiercely criticized in western media for upholding a defensive position and 
refusing to move on issues such as measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) 
and additional reduction targets, the Chinese government reconsidered its external 
rhetorical strategy. Where Chinese positions often reflected an oppositional, 
developed versus developing country perspective before 2010, more recent 
communication indicates the willingness of an inclusive and cooperative approach to 
tackle climate change, illustrated by vice-minister Xie Zhenhua of China’s National 
Reform and Development Commission: “Climate change is one of the issues of 
crucial importance to the interests of human beings and the national development of 
every country. It requires the collaborative efforts of all countries” (Xie 2011: 1). 
China’s “lay-low” strategy at COP 16, the resulting Cancun agreements and parallel 
domestic measures offer embryonic signs that the central government gradually 
intends to move from discourse to action. In China’s recent 12th Five Year Plan 
(2011-2015), the emphasis lies on relative emission reductions (compared to 
business-as-usual) derived from its 2020 carbon efficiency target, pilot emission 
trading systems in five provinces, massive investments in wind and solar technology 
production and generation capacity and an emerging long-term vision of a low-
carbon society (Qi 2011; Xinhua 2011). In addition, China has put forward 
programmes and strategies to tackle deforestation, coastal eco-system deterioration, 
water conservation and desertification in various areas of the country (State Council 
2008). 
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In light of China’s recent climate actions, one can be tempted to become either 
overly optimistic or unduly negative about the country’s potential for contributing to 
the solution of global environmental problems. Even if China tends to move at high 
speed in the direction of, for example, renewable energy development, it is certain 
that it still needs to step up its efforts to effectively tackle both its domestic 
environmental problems including climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as its 
global responsibility in the domain of environmental and climate governance - not 
unlike other major polluters such as the European Union, India or the United States.  
 
3. INDIA AS A PLAYER IN GLOBAL GOVERNEMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
To understand India’s role in global environmental governance, it is useful to go back 
in history and review the country’s rapid evolution from a developing country to an 
emerging economy with growth rates between 7 and 9 % over the past decade. This 
explosive economic growth has been accompanied by the emergence of a middle 
class and significant technological advancements. At the same time, it has resulted 
in an acceleration of environmental degradation, while insufficiently reducing poverty: 
over 80% of the Indian population still live on less than 2$ per day and the country 
remains, in many ways, strongly attached to its traditional ways of living (Damodoran 
2010).  
 
The evolving nature of the tension between economic, social and environmental 
development has significantly impacted India’s stance on global environmental 
governance.  
The focus on development has long been the central point of reference in India’s 
approach to environmental issues. At the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi set the tone for 
India’s environmental policy for decades to come when stating that “we do not wish 
to impoverish the environment any further and yet we cannot for a moment forget the 
grim poverty of large numbers of people. Are not poverty and need the greatest 
polluters?” (Gandhi 1972). Until very recently, the Indian position in environmental 
governance institutions has thus tended to be rather defensive and conservative, 
focusing on equity concerns and arguing for the right to development first and the 
necessity for industrialized countries to provide financial and technology transfer in 
line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In the run-up to 
the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, Prime Minister Singh promised, for instance, 
that his country would never exceed the average per capita emissions of 
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industrialized countries, without, however, showing preparedness to make further 
commitments (Korppoo/Luta 2009: 54). 
Yet, as a result of a rising awareness about climate change and its own vulnerability, 
India has begun to undertake actions at home, but also with a view to the global 
political debate and the negotiations under UN auspices. 
Domestically, the Indian government has initiated actions at regional and local levels, 
trying to nest global conventions, notably the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, in its national policies (Damodaran 
2010). For one, it has created national and regional versions of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), i.e. an “Indian Network for 
Comprehensive Climate Change Assessment” of monitoring bodies that are to 
provide a clearer picture of the real changes occurring within the country and will be 
publishing GHG inventories at regular intervals (Ramesh 2010). Second, it has taken 
steps to diversify its energy mix. For instance, a fuel switch from coal to gas is under 
way, while a clean energy tax on coal is levied, whose revenues will be used toward 
funding the research and development of clean energy technologies, so as to 
augment notably its solar power generating capacity. Third, India has opened up to 
the idea of emissions trading, which is currently being experimented in two of its 
states (Gujarat, Tamil Nadu). Finally, India has put into place strategies on forestry 
and coastal management. 
In global environmental negotiations, notably on climate change, India has softened 
its stance rhetorically under its new Environment and Forests Minister Ramesh, in 
office since May 2009. Although the National Environmental Policy of 2006 still 
mentioned the “over-riding priority of the right to development” as key guideline of its 
actions (Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests 2006: 43), the country has in the 
meantime demonstrated openness for environmental action beyond pure equity 
concerns. Most interestingly, it accepted an energy intensity target of 20 to 25% by 
2020 from 2005 levels, which it inscribed into the Annex of the Copenhagen Accord 
and a commitment to which it has reconfirmed since then (UNFCCC 2010). At the 
2010 Cancun climate summit, Ramesh also announced that India’s Twelfth Five 
Year Plan, to be launched in April 2012, will be centrally based on a low-carbon 
growth strategy, fulfilling a key demand by industrialized countries (Ramesh 2010). 
At the same time, the country’s stance against an international verification of its 
actions has remained, at least publicly, quite hard. To inter alia fight off what is 
perceived as too much of an external interference in its domestic policies, India has 
actively sought to join ranks with China and other emerging economies within the 
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BASIC coalition. In this group, it has taken on a key role in developing positions and 
strategies, mediating, for instance, between the US and China in Cancun.  
 
In sum, if India has become part of the problem of environmental degradation at a 
global scale, there are very recently numerous signs that it will also take on 
responsibilities as part of the solution, with the stated ambition of providing 
“responsive leadership” in global environmental governance (Ramesh 2010). It is yet 
unclear how far the planet’s most populated democratic state is precisely prepared to 
go in this regard, but there are chances that it could, in the climate domain, even 
accept binding targets in the medium-term future. 
 
4. A EUROPEAN UNION PERSPECTIVE ON CHINESE AND INDIAN 
PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
From the perspective of the European Union, China and India are already key 
players in global politics, but the EU would like to see them engaged to yet a greater 
degree in the global governance of the environment, notably when it comes to 
climate change.  
 
Generally, the Union has itself long been the strongest advocate - among the 
industrialized players - of global, legally binding regimes for tackling environmental 
(and other) problems, notably in the multilateral framework provided by the UN. This 
has been most visible in its promotion of a global framework to address climate 
change. Its external climate policies were, in recent years, supported by solid internal 
legislation, with, at its heart, the European Emissions Trading System (ETS). On this 
basis, the Union has attempted to convince China and India that it would be worth 
imitating the EU model and supporting the idea of a legally binding treaty-based 
regime on global climate change. To this end, bilateral partnerships and dialogues 
around specific topics such as environment, climate and energy (China) and health 
and education (India) were created in recent years (2007-2010).  
For a number of reasons, however, cooperation in multilateral global environmental 
governance has, to date, remained limited. 
First, the EU’s preferences and positions seem hardly compatible with those of India 
and China, who have long been - and arguably remain - primarily interested in the 
protection of their short-term economic interests. Growth, however, requires energy, 
which, under the business-as-usual scenario, will primarily stem from fossil fuels.  
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Second, fundamentally divergent perceptions of the notion of responsibility within the 
UN climate regime have added to the differences in positions, structurally preventing 
sustained cooperation. Where the division of parties to the UNFCCC into two 
categories (Annex I, i.e. industrialized countries, and non-Annex I, i.e. developing 
countries) still seemed justified on the basis of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (and respective capabilities) in the early 1990s, the 
material realities on which a leading role for the industrialized countries was 
established have fundamentally changed in the meantime. As the treaty does not 
provide for the category of “emerging country”, it comes as no surprise that China 
and India still consider themselves developing countries, regarding the world through 
the spectre of the status quo of the 1990s. Quite to the contrary, the EU, but also 
other industrialized countries, tend to look to the 2030s, when the patterns of global 
GHG emissions, if abovementioned projections can be believed, will have 
considerably changed.  
Finally, a changing institutional context has made it increasingly difficult for the EU to 
deal with each of the two countries and with the BASIC group as a whole. For the 
time being, the EU does not possess clarity on whether the countries that have 
joined together as BASIC will use the latter as a phalanx to defend the status quo, or 
if the group will become the platform for a more proactive profiling in global 
environmental/climate governance. In the former case, the BASIC countries risk 
alienating partners like AOSIS or the Least Developing Countries within their own 
negotiation coalition, dividing a G-77/China whose heterogeneity was long 
compensated only by a joint interest in equity concerns. For the EU, this would imply 
searching coalition partners among these players, as it has already done by co-
initiating the Cartagena Dialogue (of industrialized and developing countries) after 
the 2009 Copenhagen summit. If China and India used the BASIC for a more central 
role in global environmental governance, the EU might find in these countries the 
partners that the US and other industrialized parties, for various reasons, could or 
did not want to be in recent years.  
 
Against this backdrop, Europe’s perspective on the individual roles of China and 
India in global environmental governance becomes intelligible. 
 
China  
 
The EU generally seems to part from the assumption that the China’s leaders are 
very aware of domestic resource and climate vulnerability, in the context of already 
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existing problems of environmental degradation. At the same time, the Union also 
notes that China is in need of immense energy resources if it wants to sustain growth 
figures and lead its population to more widespread prosperity. For both reasons, it is 
expected that the country will engage in transforming its energy system, while, for 
quite some time yet, remaining a major polluter heavily reliant on the combustion of 
coal and oil.  
This dilemma, so it seems, also determines the way China approaches its 
international and domestic environment - notably climate and energy - policies.  
Domestically, the above-mentioned objective of a “low-carbon economy” as a 
national strategy in its 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) will partially satisfy EU 
demands. It comes with the set of measures described above, of which especially 
China’s massive development of the renewable energy sector and (new) plans for 
the use of emissions trading provide areas of further cooperation and/or interaction 
with the EU. A policy shift has taken place in recent months and years regarding the 
CDM, however. Within the European Commission, the CDM is currently seen as 
having too many environmental integrity and transparency problems, and as directly 
subsidizing a main competitor in areas such as renewables and low-carbon 
technologies (Delbeke 2011).  
At the same time, questions can be raised from an EU perspective not so much 
about the Chinese intentions, but about the country’s capacity to deliver on its 
objectives. This is especially true if one considers the reluctance of China’s 
government to commit to anything but voluntary action pledges in the global 
negotiations on climate change. The 40-45% carbon intensity target by 2020 remains 
aspirational, from an EU perspective, as long as it is kept outside of the framework of 
a legally binding agreement, and as long as no stringent international verification is 
foreseen. From a European point of view, it is currently thus unclear what role China 
precisely wants to play in global environmental governance: will it continue to be 
blocked by and in an unfruitful G-2 relationship with the US, in which both consider 
that the one who moves first loses in environmental politics? Or will it build on its 
recent action pledges and PR activities stylizing it as an environmental leader to 
really assume greater responsibilities individually and/or through the BASIC group? 
 
India 
 
When looking at India, the overarching EU premise is that the country should not be 
treated like China because the two are fundamentally different in their political, 
economic and social structures as well as their material capacities and 
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characteristics. When it comes to the effects of climate change, India is among the 
most vulnerable countries on the globe. In recent years, the EU has welcomed the 
transition from the “old guard” of Indian environmental and climate negotiators with 
their defensive and at times anti-Western discourse to a new team around the more 
conciliate Minister Ramesh. Nonetheless, the Indian situation raises some of the 
same concerns as the Chinese regarding the capacity to avoid making the mistakes 
the “West” made in the process of industrialization, the continued insistence on 
equity paired to a reluctance to commit to any binding international treaty foreseeing 
a verification and compliance mechanism. 
 
In synthesis, when considering the role of China and India in global environmental 
governance, the EU makes a clear distinction between the two players, while 
acknowledging that both are central to the future of the globe. This plays out in 
different ways: while hands-on, bilateral cooperation with both countries is being 
sought, multilateral cooperation with a view to attaining the more fundamental, 
overarching objectives of global environmental governance remains a key objective. 
In pursuing both paths, the EU has to take account of the fact that relations with the 
two countries span across many policy domains, and that the objectives in the 
environment and climate fields could come into conflict with EU interests in, for 
instance, the area of trade. 
 
5. CONCLUSION : CHINA, INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
China and India are key players in the contemporary world order - economically, 
politically, but also in terms of the environment. While they are currently often 
primarily perceived as parts of the problems that render global environmental 
governance necessary, both have the capacity of strongly contributing to their 
solution. The workshop highlighted this potential for both countries, but also noted 
the differences between them.  
 
The approach of the event, touching on the two countries directly and through an EU 
perspective obviously neglected the other crucial player in global environmental 
governance: the US. In the concrete context of the ongoing negotiations for a climate 
regime post-2012, but also in global environmental governance more widely, the 
relationship between these four players - China, India (or the BASIC), the US and 
the EU - will, however, be decisive. Currently, there seems to be a trend toward a G-
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2 (China/BASIC-US) type of arrangement that keeps the EU increasingly on the 
sidelines. This constellation favours the emergence of an action-based 
multilateralism embodied in the “pledge and review approach” of the Copenhagen 
Accord. Should China, India and the other BASIC countries decide, however, to join 
forces with the EU, a reinvigorated, treaty-based global multilateralism could become 
possible, in which US inactivity would not pay off. In both scenarios, cooperation and 
competition in the renewable energy and low-carbon technology sector is set to play 
a key role, as shown during the Cancun negotiations in December 2010. 
 
In this regard, the medium-term future of multilateral global environmental 
governance will probably be co-determined at the upcoming climate negotiations in 
Durban this year and/or at the Rio+20 summit in 2012. While these events in South 
Africa and Brazil provide major opportunities for these two BASIC members to profile 
as responsible global players, their success will - to a large extent - depend on the 
behaviour of their partners China and India.  
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Annex I: Programme 
 
 
14h00 Welcome and introduction by the chair  
 Prof. H. Bruyninckx, Director, HIVA, Professor of International 
Relations and Global Environmental Governance, University of 
Leuven  
  
14h15 India and global environmental governance 
 Prof. A. Damodaran, Professor in Economics and Social Sciences, 
Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore 
 
14h45 China and global environmental governance 
Dr. J. Chen, Second Secretary, Mission of the People’s Republic of 
China to the European Union 
 
15h15 The role of China and India in global environmental governance: 
a view from the European Union 
 Mr. J. Lefevere, Adviser, International and Climate Strategy, DG 
Climate Action, European Commission 
   
15h40   Q&A  
 
16h00  End of the workshop
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